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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-3294 
 
GOULD INC. 
 
v. 
 
A & M BATTERY & TIRE SERVICE; ALBER T NIVERT & 
CO.; ALEXANDRIA SCRAP CORPORATION; BEN 
WEITSMAN & SON, INC. OF OSWEGO, NY; ALL STA TE 
METAL COMPANY; AMERICAN SCRAP CO.; AMSOURCE 
(PENN IRON & METAL); B. MILLENS & SONS, INC.; 
BARNEY SNYDER, INC.; BRISTOL METAL CO., INC.; 
BROCK'S SCRAP & SALVAGE; BROOKFIELD AUTO 
WRECKERS, INC.; BROOKFIELD METAL CO.; BUFFERED 
JUNK CO.; CAPITOL IRON & STEEL CO., INC.; CAPITOL 
SCRAP IRON & METALS; CHARLES BLUESTONE CO., 
INC.; CLAREMONT METAL & PAPER STOCK; CLINTON 
METAL CO.; COMMERCIAL IRON & METAL CO.; 
CONSERVIT, INC.; COOPER METALLURGICAL CORP.; 
COUSINS METAL; CRESTWOOD METAL CORP .; DAVIS 
BROS. SCRAP CO., INC.; DAVIS INDUSTRIES; ELMAN 
RECYCLING CO.; EMPIRE RECYCLING CORP.; EXETER 
METALS CO.; F. SCHANERMAN; FAIRFIELD SCRAP CO.; 
FREDERICK JUNK CO.; FULTON IRON & STEEL CO.; 
GARBOSE METAL; GELB & CO., INC.; GIORDANO 
WASTE MATERIAL CO., in its own capacity and as the 
successor to Halpern Metals Company; GREENBLOTT 
METAL CO., INC.; GUTTERMAN IRON & METAL CORP.; 
H. & D. METAL CO.; H. SHAKESPEARE & SONS, INC.; 
HARRY GOLDBERG & SONS; HURWITZ BROS. IRON & 
METAL CO.; I. SHULMAN & SON CO., INC.; I. SOLOMON 
METAL CO., INC.; INDEPENDENT IRON & MET AL; 
INTERSTATE BURLAP & BAG CO.; ITHACA SCRAP 
PROCESSORS; J & J METALS, INC.; J. BROOMFIELD & 
SON, INC.; J. SEPENUK & SONS, INC.; JAMES 
BURROWS COMPANY, INC.; JOE KRENTZMAN & SONS; 
 
 
  
JOSEPH FREEDMAN CO., INC.; JOSH STEEL CO.; 
KELLEHER BATTERY; KLEIN METAL CO., INC.; 
KLIONSKY SCRAP IRON & METAL CO.; LAKE ERIE 
RECYCLING; LARAMI METAL CO.; LIBERTY IRON & 
METAL CO., INC.; LOUIS COHEN & SON, INC.; LOUIS 
KUTZ & SON; LYELL METAL; M. HARTMAN, CO.; 
MARLEY'S DIVISION OF ABE COOPER, Liverpool, NY; 
MAXNOR META/M. SCHIPPER & SON; MEYER-SABA 
METAL, CO.; MID-CITY SCRAP IRON & SALV AGE, CO., 
INC.; MODERN JUNK & SALVAGE, CO.; MONTGOMERY 
IRON & METAL CO.; MORGAN HIGHWAY AUTO PARTS; 
NEWBURGH SCRAP CO.; OLEAN STEEL SALES & 
SERVICE; P. JACOBSON, INC.; P. K. SCRAP METAL CO.; 
PASCAP CO., INC.; PENN HARRIS METALS CORP .; PENN 
JERSEY RUBBER & WASTE CO.; R & R SALV AGE INC.; 
R. L. POETH SCRAPYARD; RIEGEL SCRAP & SAL VAGE; 
ROTH BROTHERS SMELTING CORP.; ROTH STEEL 
CORPORATION; S & J GENERATORS & ST ARTER CO.; S. 
KASOWITZ & SONS, INC.; SAM KAUFMAN & SON 
METALS CO.; SEGAL & SONS, INC.; SQUARE DEAL 
METAL RECYCLING; STATE LINE SCRAP CO., INC.; 
SUISMAN & BLUMENTHAL; TIMPSON SALVAGE CO.; 
TWIN CITIES WASTE & METAL; UNITED MET AL 
TRADERS, INC.; V. VACCARO SCRAP CO.; W ALDORF 
METAL CO.; WALLACE STEEL, INC.; WEINER 
BROKERAGE CORP.; WEINER IRON & METAL CORP.; 
WEINSTEIN & CO.; WILLIAM F. SULLIVAN & CO.; WIMCO 
METALS, INC.; JOINT DEFENSE GROUP; PETTINELI 
USED AUTO PARTS; DE MICROMIS GROUP; MARJOL 
SITE RETAILERS' JOINT DEFESNE GROUP; MICRO 
GROUP; WHITE & WILLIAMS DEFENSE GROUP; MARJOL 
SITE DE MINIMUS SCRAPDEALERS GROUP; MARJOL 
SITE PRP GROUP; EXXON, INC.; BODOW RECYCLING 
CO.; KASSAB BROTHERS STEEL; CHARLES MEYER & 
SON; ALLAN INDUSTRIES; ATTONITO RECYCLING 
CORPORATION; CRASH'S AUTO PARTS & AUTO 
SALES/CAP SURPLUS SCRAP METAL; CHARLES 
EFFRON; CHAUNCEY SCRAP METALS; COATSVILLE 
SCRAP; H. BIXON & SONS SCRAP & METAL; DA VIS 
INDUSTRIES OF ARLINGTON, VA; 
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FRANK H. NOTT, INC.; G. CARLOMANGO, INC.; GEORGE 
MARS MKM BUILDERS; HUDSON SCRAP CO.; 
JACOBSON METAL CO.; ENOS METALS; KREIGER 
WASTE; FIEGLEMAN RECYCLING CO.; LOUIS MACK & 
CO. SCRAP METAL; LUKENS METAL CO.; M & M SCRAP 
METAL CO.; M. LEVENSON CO., INC.; MARSON MET ALS, 
INC.; N. BANTIVOLGLIO SONS PAPER & MET ALS, INC.; 
NORWITZ, INC.; P. LEWIS & SONS; P ATCHOGUE SHEET 
METAL SHOP; RICHARDSON GRAPHICS; 
BLADENSBURG/RIVER ROAD METALS CO.; ST. MARY'S 
IRON & STEEL CORP.; ZUCKERMAN SCRAP CO., INC.; 
KEARNEY SCRAP CO.; MARLEY'S DIVISION OF ABE 
COOPER; RIVERSIDE IRON & STEEL CORP.; A. ALLAN 
INDUSTRIES, INC., t/a Allan Industries; A. SHAPIRO & 
SONS; ABE COOPER SYRACUSE; ABE 
COOPER-WATERTOWN CORP.; ABE E. NATHAN & SONS; 
ABE N. SOLOMON, INC.; ACADEMY IRON & METAL CO.; 
ACME METALS & RECYCLING, INC.; ACTION MET AL 
COMPANY, INC.; ADVANCE AUTO STORES; AMERICAN 
BAG & METAL CO., INC.; AMERICAN SCRAP & W ASTE 
REMOVAL CO.; AMERICAN SCRAP PROCESSING, INC., 
d/b/a Riverside Iron & Steel; ANNADALE SCRAP 
COMPANY; ANNE PIRCHESKY, former shareholder of 
Eric's Iron & Steel Corp., a dissolved corporation f/d/b/a 
Riverside Iron & Steel Corp.; ARCHBALD WRECKING CO.; 
ATLANTIC BATTERY CORPORATION; B. ZEFF COMPANY, 
INC.; N. BANTIVOLGLIO METALS, INC., renamed as 
Bantivoglio Metal Company a/k/a Bantivolgio Metals and 
f/k/a N. Bantivoglio's Sons, Inc.; BEAVER SMELTING 
AND REFINING CORP.; BLADENSBURG RIVER ROAD 
METALS COMPANY, INC.; CAMBRIDGE IRON AND METAL 
CO., INC.; CAPITOL SCRAPYARD; CASH AUTOMOTIVE 
PARTS; CHAPIN & FAGIN DIVISION OF GCF INC.; 
CHARLES MEYERS & SONS; CHAUNCEY METAL 
PROCESSORS, INC.; CLIMAX MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, a/k/a Spevak's Waste Material Company; 
COATESVILLE SCRAP IRON & METAL CO., INC.; 
COLONIAL METALS; CONTINENTAL METALS 
CORPORATION; CROPSEY SCRAP IRON AND METAL; 
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D. KATZ & SONS, INC.; DANIELS & MILLER, INC.; 
DECKER BROTHERS, INC.; DENAPLES AUTO PARTS; 
DENVER CONSTRUCTION CORP., f/d/b/a Lukens Metal 
Co.; DOUGLAS BATTERY MFG., INC.; E. EFFRON & SON; 
EISNER BROTHERS; ERIC'S IRON & STEEL 
CORPORATION, f/k/a Riverside Iron & Steel Corp; ERIC 
PIRCHESKY, former shareholder of Eric's Iron & Steel 
Corp., a dissolved corporation f/d/b/a Riverside Ir on & 
Steel Corp.; FRANCIS WHITE SCRAP IRON & METAL; 
GLICK IRON & METAL CO., INC.; G. CARLOMAGNO 
SCRAP; G.M. HONKUS & SONS, INC.; GENERAL 
BATTERY CORP.; GENERAL MET ALS & SMELTING CO.; 
GEORGE MOSS; HARRY KAUFMAN; GORDON STEEL 
CO.; GORDON WASTE CO.; H&B METAL CO., INC.; 
HAROLD STRAUSS, in his own capacity and as 
distributee of the assets of Denver Construction 
Corporation f/d/b/a Lukens Metal Co.; HARRY'S 
SCRAPYARD; HUDSON SCRAP METAL, INC.; I. KRAMER 
AND SONS, INC.; I. RICHMOND & COMPANY, INC.; 
INDUSTRIAL & MILL SUPPLIERS, INC.; IRVING RUBBER 
& METAL COMPANY; J.C. PENNEY COMP ANY, INC.; 
JACOB SHER, f/d/b/a Hudson Scrap; JEM METAL, INC.; 
JULIAN C. COHEN SALVAGE CO.; K MAR T CORP.; 
KASMAR METALS, INC.; KASSAB BROS.; KEARNY SCRAP 
CO.; KREIGER WASTE PAPER CO.; LANCASTER BATTERY 
CO., INC.; LANCASTER IRON & METAL CO., INC., a 
former division of Lancaster Steel Co., Inc.; LEVENE'S 
SON, INC.; LEVINE'S IRON & METAL, INC.; LEWIS 
RAPHAELSON & SON, INC.; LONI-JO METALS, f/t/a 
Attonito Recycling Corporation; LOUIS FIEGLEMAN & 
CO.; LOUIS LEVIN & CO., INC.; LOUIS MACK CO., INC.; 
LUKENS METAL CORP., d/b/a Lukens Metal Co.; M&M 
SCRAP CORPORATION; M&P SCRAP IRON & MET AL 
CORP.; M.C. CANFIELD SONS, f/k/a and f/t/a Lukens 
Metal Corp.; M.H. BRENNER'S INC.; M. BURNSTEIN AND 
COMPANY, INC.; M. ROSENBERG & SON, INC.; M. 
WILDER & SON, INCORPORATED; METAL BANK OF 
AMERICA; NOLTS AUTO PARTS, /Nolt's Factory 
Warehouse; NORFOLK RECYCLING CORPORA TION; 
NORTHEAST INDUSTRIAL BATTERIES, INC.; NOTT 
ENTERPRISES, INC., f/k/a Frank H. Nott, Inc.; 
 
                                4 
  
NOVEY METAL CO.; PAVONIA SCRAP IRON & METAL 
COMPANY, INC.; PEDDLERS JUNK CO.; PERLMAN & 
SONS; PHILIP LEWIS & SONS; RIVER ROAD PRODUCTS, 
INC.; ROSEN BROTHERS; S. KLEIN METALS CO., INC.; 
S. ROME & CO., INC.; S.E.L. METAL CORPORA TION; ST. 
MARY'S AUTO WRECKERS; SAMUEL GORDON & SONS, 
INC.; SCHIAVONE & SON, INC.; renamed as Schiavone 
Corp.; SCHILBERG INTERGRATED METALS, INC., 
f/d/b/a Schilberg Iron & Metal Co., Inc.; SEABOARD 
SALVAGE; SITKIN METAL TRADING, INC.; STIKIN 
SMELTING & REFINING, INC.; SMITH IRON & MET AL 
CO.; SOLA METAL; SONE' ALLOYS, INC., d/b/a Enos 
Metals; STAGER WRECKING CO.; STAIMAN INDUSTRIES, 
INC.; SYRACUSE MATERIALS RECOVERY CORP .; TED 
SCHWEEN; TEPLITZ'S MIDDLETOWN SCRAP, f/t/a 
Middletown Scrap Iron, Inc.; THE BEST BA TTERY 
COMPANY, INC.; TOWANDA IRON & METAL, INC.; UNION 
CORPORATION, f/t/a Jacobson Metal Co.; UNITED 
HOLDING CO., INC., a/k/a United Iron & Metal 
Company, Inc.; UNITED SCRAP IRON & METAL CO.; 
USA; UNIVERSAL WASTE, INC.; VINCENT A. P ACE 
SCRAP METALS; VIRGINIA IRON & METAL COMP ANY, 
INC., renamed as Virginia Ir on & Metal Company of 
Portsmouth, Inc.; VIRGINIA SCRAP IRON & METAL CO., 
INC.; WILLIAM R. SULLENBERGER CO.; WILSON 
BATTERY COMPANY, renamed as Wilson Battery & Oil 
Company; WM. PORT'S SONS, INC.; ZUCKERMAN 
COMPANY, INC.; ZUCKERMAN STEEL COMP ANY, INC.; 
MEADVILLE METAL COMPANY; S. KAPLAN & SONS; 
BATAVIA WASTE MATERIAL CO., INC.; BATTERY 
MARKETING CORPORATION (BMC); BRIDGEPORT AUTO 
PARTS, INC. f/d/b/a GREAT LAKES BA TTERY; BUFF & 
BUFF, INC.; CAL'S AUTO SERVICE, INC.; CHEMUNG 
SUPPLY CORP., d/b/a Otsego Iron & Metal; CHEVRON 
CORPORATION, f/t/a Gulf Tire & Supply Co.; CHIDNESE 
SCRAP METAL; CORNING MATERIALS, INC.; EXIDE 
CORP., f/t/a Bay State Battery and Mid-Atlantic 
Distributors; THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 
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COMPANY, f/t/a Ameron Auto Centers; HODES 
INDUSTRIES, INC.; J. SAX & CO.; JOHN BRUNSES & 
SON; KOVALCHICK SALVAGE CO.; MAX BROCK CO., 
INC.; MICHIGAN LEAD BATTERY CO.; MORRIS J. 
RADOV, f/d/b/a Meadville Waste Company; N. 
BANTIVOLGLIO'S SONS, INC., a/k/a Bantivolglio 
Investment Co.; NEW CASTLE JUNK; PETTINELLI IRON & 
METAL; QUALITY STORES, INC., d/b/a Quality Far m & 
Fleet; SAM KASSAB; SHELL OIL CO., INC.; TEXTRON, 
INC.; UNIVERSAL COOPERATIVES, INC.; WESTERN AUTO 
SUPPLY CO.; WM. KUGLER & BROS., INC., WORCESTER 
METAL & BATTERY; YATES BATTERY CO.; FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT GROUP; THE FIEGLEMAN GROUP; 
NAPORANO IRON & METAL CO.; PHILIP MAY CO. 
 
v. 
 
MODERN JUNK & SALVAGE CO.; ALEXANDRIA SCRAP 
CORPORATION; BRISTOL METAL CO., INC., HUDSON 
SCRAP METAL, INC.; JACOB SHER; BLADENSBURG 
RIVER ROAD METALS COMPANY, INC.; JOINT DEFENSE 
GROUP; WIMCO METALS, INC., 
       Third Party Plaintiffs 
 
v. 
 
PHILLIP A. WEINSTEIN; ESTATE OF JOSEPH WEINSTEIN; 
LAWRENCE FIEGLEMAN; UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; UNITED ST ATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; RICHARD B. CHENEY (in 
his capacity as Secretary of Defense); H. LA WRENCE 
GARRETT, III (in his capacity as Secr etary of the Navy); 
DONALD B. RICE (in his capacity as Secretary of the Air 
Force); MICHAEL P.W. STONE (in his capacity as 
Secretary of the Army); DEFENSE REUTILIZA TION AND 
MARKETING SERVICE; JOHN STEWART , COLONEL (in 
his capacity as the Director of the Defense Reutilization 
and Marketing Service); UNITED STATES DEFENSE 
LOGISTICS AGENCY; CHARLES MCCLAUSAND, GENERAL 
(in his capacity as head of the Defense Logistics Agency); 
RAY ATKINSON; BUFF & BUFF, INC.; 
 
                                6 
  
BURLINGTON WASTE & METAL; CAPITOL BAG & WASTE 
CO., INC.; CAPITOL SCRAP METAL CO.; RAY 
CARDAMONE; R. COHEN & SON OF GLENS FALLS, INC.; 
ROBERT DAVIS; EASCO WAREHOUSE; FERRO SCRAP 
IRON & METAL, INC.; I. FIGELMAN & SON; S. 
GARBOWITZ & SON, INC.; ARNOLD GROWICK; NATHAN 
H. KELMAN, INC.; NATHAN'S WASTE & P APER STOCK 
CO., INC.; NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY; ONT ARIO 
SCRAP METAL INC.; LOUIS PERLMAN & SONS, INC.; T .A. 
PREDEL & CO., INC.; SAM T. ROSEN, INC., for merly 
known as Otsego Iron & Metal Corporation; V ALLEY 
STEEL, INC.; WILLIAM ANSETT WASTE CO., INC.; ZEKE'S 
ENTERPRISES; LARRY TEITEL; TFCFINANCIAL 
CORPORATION; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE; LAWRENCE 
FIEGLEMAN; JOSEPH FIEGLEMAN; MARC A. ROBIN; 
ANTHONY BONADIO; JOHN DELEO; JOSEPH STRAUB; 
ROBERT MCANDREW; WILLIAM SULLENBERGER; M.N. 
ADELSON & SONS, INC.; M. BERKOWITZ & COMPANY , 
INC.; GEORGE BERMAN & SON, INC.; JAMES BURROWS 
COMPANY; PETER CLAIM; P.J. GRECO & SON, INC.; 
JOE'S JUNK COMPANY; MEADVILLE METAL COMP ANY; 
MENZOCK SCRAP COMPANY; MILLER ROOT & FUR 
COMPANY; BERNARD PIRCHESKY; OSCAR PLATT; MAX 
SILVER & SONS; BARNEY SNYDER OF OHIO, INC., 
       Third Party Defendants 
 
American Scrap Company; Lake Erie Recycling; 
Alexandria Scrap Corporation; R&R Salvage, Inc., 
       Appellants 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(D.C. No. 91-cv-01714) 
District Judge: The Honorable Richard P . Conaboy 
 
ARGUED July 19, 2000 
 
BEFORE: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and FUENTES, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed October 31, 2000) 
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       Donald B. Mitchell, Jr., Esq. 
        (Argued) 
       Rachel G. Lattimore, Esq. 
       Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn 
       1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
       Washington, DC 20036-5339 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
 
       Dennis R. Suplee, Esq. (Argued) 
       Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis 
       1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
       John M. Armstrong, Esq. 
       Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis 
       220 Lake Drive East, Suite 200 
       Cherry Hill, NJ 08002-1165 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case arises from a contribution action initiated by 
appellee, Gould, Inc., under S 113 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. S 9613. Appellants, Alexandria Scrap 
Corporation, R&R Salvage Company, Lake Erie Recycling, 
and American Scrap Company, appeal from several District 
Court orders in favor of Gould. Although appellants denied 
liability on several bases below, the sole issue they raise on 
appeal is whether the post-judgment enactment of the 
Superfund Recycling Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 
Stat. 1536 (November 29, 1999), requires r eversal of the 
judgments entered against them. We conclude that it does, 
and will, therefore, vacate the judgment of the District 
Court, and remand the cause for further pr oceedings. 
 
I. Background Facts 
 
From 1961 to 1980, the Marjol Battery and Equipment 
Company operated a battery breaking (i.e., r ecycling) facility 
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in the Borough of Throop, Lackawana County, 
Pennsylvania. Appellants, all scrap metal dealers, each sold 
spent lead-acid batteries to Marjol during the 1960s and 
1970s for recycling. One appellant, Alexandria Scrap 
Corporation, also sold non-battery, or "soft" lead to Marjol. 
 
The lead-acid battery recycling process is referred to as 
"breaking" because it literally r equires the recycler to break 
open the battery's outer casing and remove its lead and 
other recyclable components. Until the 1970s, the battery 
casings themselves, which were then made of har d rubber, 
were not recyclable. As a consequence, the casings were 
simply discarded, often contaminated with various amounts 
of residual lead and other toxic substances. Each of the 
appellants, like all of Marjol's suppliers at the time, sold 
spent lead-acid batteries to Marjol manufactur ed with hard 
rubber casings. The vast majority, if not all, of such casings 
were eventually dumped into old mine shafts located on 
Marjol's property, or otherwise buried on site. 
 
Beginning in the late 1970s, battery manufactur ers 
began producing lead-acid batteries with casings made of 
polypropylene plastic rather than rubber . Eventually, 
battery recyclers such as Marjol found ways to recycle the 
plastic casings as well as other components fr om spent 
batteries. While trying to develop processes for recycling the 
plastic casings, however, Marjol simply stockpiled 
innumerable, broken, plastic casings on its pr operty. Like 
their hard rubber predecessors, these plastic casings were 
contaminated with lead and other toxic substances, and 
Marjol made virtually no effort to keep those substances 
from migrating through the environment. 
 
As early as the 1960s, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources ("DER") began receiving 
complaints about emissions from the Marjol site. There is 
no question that Marjol's operations contaminated both its 
own property and its neighbors'. At the time, however, 
environmental law was largely undeveloped, and 
enforcement was generally lax. 
 
On March 7, 1967, the DER's Bureau of Air Pollution 
Control entered an order requiring Marjol to reduce 
emissions from its site to the point that no emissions would 
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be detectable beyond its property line. Marjol repeatedly 
violated that order, first by failing to install the necessary 
equipment, and then by rendering it inef fective because it 
had slowed the speed of battery processing. Between 1975 
and 1977, the DER issued a cease operations r equest that 
Marjol refused, and several remedial or ders that it generally 
ignored. 
 
In early 1980, Gould, Inc., of Ohio, agreed to acquire 
Marjol. When the DER learned of the planned acquisition, 
it conducted further investigations at the Marjol site and 
ultimately issued an "end of the line" or der. That order 
essentially required Marjol to comply with the DER's 
remedial demands or cease operations. Gould, which was 
generally aware of Marjol's history with the DER, went 
ahead with the acquisition, and initiated measur es to 
comply with the DER's remedial demands. Ultimately, 
however, Gould agreed to shut down the Marjol site. 
 
Thereafter, the DER advised Gould that no further 
remediation of the Marjol site would be r equired, and no 
further enforcement actions taken, unless battery-breaking 
operations resumed. Gould performed various forms of 
maintenance and "housekeeping" at the Marjol site, but 
otherwise generally conducted no activities ther e. Later, the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") initiated 
investigations of the Marjol site, ultimately deter mining 
"that hazardous substances had been r eleased, and that 
there was an `imminent and substantial endangerment' to 
the public health, welfare, or the envir onment." Appellee's 
Br. at 5-6. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
In April 1988, Gould entered into a Consent Agr eement 
and Order with the EPA under S 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 
U.S.C. S 9606. That agreement requir ed Gould to conduct 
site stabilization activities relating to lead and other 
hazardous substances at and around the Marjol site. In 
May 1990, Gould entered into a second consent order, this 
time with both the EPA and the Pennsylvania DER. This 
second order under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. S 6928(h), requir ed Gould to 
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perform a Facility Investigation and Corrective Measure 
Study at the Marjol site. 
 
In December 1991, Gould initiated a civil action seeking 
cost recovery from approximately 240 Potentially 
Responsible Parties ("PRP's") pursuant toS 107(a)(4)(B) of 
CERCLA, or, alternatively, contribution pursuant to S 113. 
The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, 
arguing that because Gould was a responsible party who 
had entered into a consent agreement r esolving its liability 
to the government, it was limited to asserting a 
contribution claim only. The District Court agr eed, and 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. See Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & T ire Serv., 
901 F. Supp. 906, 910 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
 
The District Court held a bench trial on the issue of 
allocating response costs among those defendants held 
liable to Gould for contribution and held "that Gould 
should bear 75% of the clean-up costs and that the 
Defendants should bear the remaining 25% . . . ." Gould, 
Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 987 F. Supp. 353, 372 
(M.D. Pa. 1997). The court then apportioned the 
defendants' 25% share according to the amount of waste 
each contributed to the Marjol site. See id. 
 
With the exception of the four appellants, Gould 
eventually settled with all defendants. After appellants filed 
their notice of appeal, Congress passed, and the President 
signed, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act . Appellants are 
pursuing only their claim that this Act shields them from 
contribution liability to Gould. Gould counters that the Act 
does not apply to materials that contain non-r ecyclable 
components, that it does not apply retr oactively to this 
case, and that if it does apply retroactively, it violates the 
Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee. 
 
III. Background Law 
 
Under CERCLA: 
 
       Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and 
       subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) 
       of [42 U.S.C. S 9607] -- 
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        (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or 
       otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment . . . of 
       hazardous substances owned or possessed by such 
       person, [shall be liable for] 
 
       (A) all costs of removal or remedial act ion incurred by 
       the United States Government or a State or an Indian 
       tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency 
       plan; 
 
       (B) any other necessary costs of response inc urred by 
       any other person consistent with the national 
       contingency plan; 
 
       (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss  of 
       natural resources, including the r easonable costs of 
       assessing such injury, destruction, or loss r esulting 
       from such a release; and 
 
       (D) the costs of any health assessment or health e ffects 
       study carried out under [42 U.S.C. S 9604(i)]. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 9607(a). 
 
After failing to pass several earlier versions, Congress 
passed, and on November 29, 1999, the President signed 
into law, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-113, Div. B, S 1000(a)(9) [S. 1948, T itle VII, 6001(b)(1)], 
113 Stat. 1536 (November 29, 1999). The Act, intended to 
clarify liability under CERCLA, provides that a person who 
meets certain specified criteria, and "who arranged for 
recycling of a recyclable material shall not be liable under 
sections 9607(a)(3) and 9607(a)(4) of [42 U.S.C.] with 
respect to such material." 42 U.S.C. S 9627(a)(1). The Act 
defines a "recyclable material" to include, inter alia, "spent 
lead-acid, spent nickel-cadmium, and other spent batteries 
. . . ." Id. S 9627(b). 
 
In transactions involving spent lead-acid batteries, the 
transaction: 
 
       shall be deemed to be arranging for recycling if the 
       person who arranged for the transaction (by selling 
       recyclable material or otherwise arranging for the 
       recycling of recyclable material) can demonstrate by a 
       preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the 
       transaction-- 
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       (1) the person met the criteria set forth in[S 9627(c)] 
       with respect to the spent lead-acid batteries; and 
 
       (2)(A) [t]he person was in compliance with a pplicable 
       Federal environmental regulations or standards, and 
       any amendments thereto, regarding the storage, 
       transport, management, or other activities associated 
       with the recycling of spent lead-acid batteries[.]" 
 
Id. S 9627(e)(1) & (2)(A). 
 
Although the Act does contain several exclusions, see id. 
S 9627(f), only one is at issue here. Mor e a limitation than 
an exclusion, S 9627(i) provides that the recycling 
exemptions established by the Act "shall not af fect any 
concluded judicial or administrative action or any pending 
judicial action initiated by the United States  prior to 
[November 29, 1999]." (emphasis added). 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
A. Retroactivity 
 
By its express language, the Act has no ef fect on "any 
concluded judicial or administrative action or any pending 
judicial action initiated by the United States prior" to its 
enactment. 42 U.S.C. S 9627(i). This section exempts two 
categories of action from retroactive application of the Act. 
One category exempts all actions concluded as of November 
29, 1999, whether administrative or judicial in nature. The 
second category exempts pending actions initiated by the 
United States prior to November 29, 1999, but only if they 
are judicial in nature. By implication or negative inference, 
then, Congress intended the Act to apply r etroactively to all 
other types of actions. One District Court case, Morton Int'l 
Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 2000 WL 1038176, at *9 (D. 
N.J. July 19, 2000) has held that the language of the Act 
reflects Congress' intent that the r ecycling exemption apply 
to pending private party actions, thus applying retroactively 
to, inter alia, judicial and administrative actions that were: 
(1) initiated prior to November 29, 1999; (2) initiated by a 
party other than the United States; and (3) still pending as 
of November 29, 1999. We agree. This case is a judicial 
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action, initiated by a private party, and was pending on 
appeal as of November 29, 1999. 
 
Gould argues that whenever a private party initiates a 
judicial action following a related federal administrative 
action, the causal link between the two requir es the court 
to deem the judicial action to have been initiated by the 
United States. Gould's proffered construction of S 9627(i) is 
belied not only by the Act's plain language, but also by its 
legislative history. Beginning in 1994, legislators 
introduced, and the two houses of Congr ess considered, 
various versions of the Act before finally succeeding in 
passing it in November 1999. See, e.g. , 145 Cong. Rec. 
S10391-01, S10433 (August 5, 1999) ("The language of this 
bill is the culmination of a process that we have been 
working on since the 103rd Congress."). Though broadly 
supported, congressional approval eluded the Act for 
several years because it was attached to lar ger, and far 
more controversial, attempts to refor m CERCLA as a whole. 
 
As a consequence of its protracted gestation, much of the 
Act's relevant legislative history was cr eated in connection 
with its failed predecessors. Nevertheless, the history of 
prior bills is not entirely irrelevant to our interpretation of 
their enacted successors. In the case of the Super fund 
Recycling Equity Act, the history associated with prior 
versions is all the more relevant because the proposed 
statutory language, as well as the intent of its drafters, 
remained consistent throughout the pr otracted effort to 
pass it. 
 
The 106th Congress passed the Act as part of an 
omnibus legislation package approved near the end of its 
1999 Session. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, 
106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-598 (November 29, 1999). 
The version of the Act ultimately enacted was first 
introduced as a stand-alone bill in the Senate, see S. 1528, 
reprinted in 145 Cong. Rec. S10391-01, S10432 (August 5, 
1999), which ultimately attached it to a lar ger bill pending 
before that legislative chamber. See  S. 1948, as enacted at 
113 Stat. 1501A-521. During discussions of that lar ger bill, 
Senator Lott obtained unanimous consent to insert the 
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Act's legislative history into the recor d. See 145 Cong. Rec. 
S14986-03, S15048 (November 19, 1999).1  
 
According to that history, the Act "pr ovides for relief from 
liability for both retroactive and pr ospective transactions," 
id. at S15049, and "[a]ny pending judicial action, whether 
it was brought in a trial or appellate court, by a private 
party shall be subject to the grant of relief from liability." 
Id. at S15050. The same history further explains that 
"Congress intends that any third party action or joinder of 
defendants brought by a private party shall be considered 
a private party action, regardless of whether or not the 
original lawsuit was brought by the United States." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
If the Act applies retroactively even to private-party 
actions prompted by exempted federal judicial actions, it 
makes no sense to conclude that it does not apply 
retroactively to private actions pr ompted by non-exempt 
administrative actions. Thus, these expressions of 
congressional intent and others found thr oughout the Act's 
legislative history, even if not controlling, clearly support a 
common-sense construction of the Act that applies it 
retroactively to private judicial actions such as this. 
 
B. Due Process 
 
Gould argues that if the Act applies r etroactively, then it 
violates the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee 
because it lacks a rational basis. More specifically, Gould 
argues, the Act: 
 
       creates an arbitrary classification which r ewards a 
       recalcitrant PRP who forced the United States to 
       expend effort and its resources tofile suit, but 
       penalizes a responsible PRP, like Gould, which agreed 
       to clean up a battery-breaking site. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although there might be some question about reliance on a History 
prepared by one senator and thereafter inserted with unanimous consent 
because it does not appear to have been appr oved in substance by either 
a Committee or a majority of the Senate, in this case we rely on Senator 
Lott's History because Gould has not objected. 
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Appellee's Br. at 33. 
 
To pass rational-basis review, however , the Act need only 
be justifiable on some rational basis. Mor eover, it is not 
necessary that Congress have actually articulated a 
particular rational basis. Instead, " `the burden is on the 
one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every 
conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not 
the basis has a foundation in the recor d.' " Contractors 
Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1011 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)). Here, 
the distinction between privately and federally initiated 
judicial actions is rationally related to pr eserving the public 
fisc. For instance, the distinction ensures that once the 
United States has expended public funds to initiate a 
judicial action, the Act does not render that expenditure 
wasted by exempting an otherwise covered person from 
liability. In affording such fiscal pr otection, the Act 
rationally distinguishes between the United States, a non- 
culpable party, and a party such as Gould who actually 
contributed to the contamination underlying its claim for 
contribution. That rationale is enough to pass 
constitutional muster. Thus, the Act can and does apply 
retroactively without violating due pr ocess. 
 
C. The Act's Effect on The Summary Judgment 
 
Having concluded that the Superfund Recycling Equity 
Act applies retroactively, the next issue is whether the Act 
exempts appellants from liability. Under the Act, a person 
who arranged for recycling of a recycling material is exempt 
from CERCLA liability with respect to that material. See 42 
U.S.C. S 9627(a)(1). The Act defines a "r ecyclable material" 
to include, inter alia, spent lead-acid batteries. See id. 
S 9627(b). That definition is not limited to the lead 
contained in spent lead-acid batteries, nor to its casing, nor 
to any other individual or combination of individual 
components. The Act plainly and unambiguously defines 
the entire spent lead-acid battery as a "r ecyclable material." 
See id. 
 
       [A] transaction involving spent lead-acid batteries . . . 
       shall be deemed to be arranging for recycling if the 
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       person who arranged for the transaction (by selling[the 
       lead-acid batteries] or otherwise arranging the r ecycling 
       of [the lead-acid batteries]) can demonstrate by a 
       preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the 
       transaction: 
 
       (1) The [spent lead-acid battery] met a comm ercial 
       specification grade. 
 
       (2) A market existed for the [spent lead-acid b attery]. 
 
       (3) A substantial portion of the [spent lead-ac id 
       battery] was made available for use as feedstock for 
       the manufacture of a new saleable product. 
 
       (4) The [spent lead-acid battery] could have  been a 
       replacement or substitute for a virgin raw material, 
       or the product to be made from the [spent lead-acid 
       battery] could have been a replacement or substitute 
       for a product made, in whole or in part, fr om a virgin 
       raw material. 
 
Id. S 9627(c), incorporated by reference into S 9627(e)(1).2 
 
The parties' primary disagreement on this issue concerns 
whether the spent lead-acid batteries in question could 
have been a replacement or substitute for a vir gin raw 
material as the fourth element requires. Appellants argue 
that the requirement applies only to those portions of a 
spent lead-acid battery that are recyclable. Gould, on the 
other hand, argues that the "replacement or substitute 
provision" applies to the whole battery and that the Act 
does not apply unless every component of the spent lead- 
acid battery at issue is recyclable, and each component can 
be "a replacement or substitute for a vir gin material." 
Appellee's Br. at 38-54. 
 
Stated differently, Gould concedes the third element 
requires only that "a `substantial portion' of the recyclable 
material was in fact made available for use as a feedstock 
in a manufacturing process." Appellee's Br . at 38 (emphasis 
added). But Gould argues that the fourth "element requires 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Act's additional requirements for exemption from liability are not 
at issue in this case. See 42 U.S.C. S 9627(c), incorporated by reference 
in S 9627(e)(1); id. S 9627(i)(e)(2)(A). 
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a purported recycler seeking the protection of the statute to 
show that all, not just a `substantial portion' as in element 
3, of the recyclable material `could have been' either a 
direct or indirect replacement for a raw material." Id. 
(emphasis added). Thus, Gould concludes, appellants are 
not covered by the Act because they sold Marjol spent lead- 
acid batteries made with non-recyclable rubber casings. 
 
Gould's argument, and therefore its conclusion, fail for 
several reasons. First, the language of the Act itself belies 
Gould's argument. As previously noted, the Act defines a 
recyclable material to include the entir e "spent lead-acid 
battery." It makes no distinction between spent lead-acid 
batteries that are wholly recyclable, and those that contain 
non-recyclable components. This lack of distinction is all 
the more significant when considered in light of the Act's 
purposes, and the context in which it was passed. For 
instance, one of the Act's purposes is "to r emove the 
disincentives and impediments to recycling cr eated as an 
unintended consequence of the 1980 Superfund liability 
provisions." S. 1948 S 6001(a)(3), as enacted at 113 Stat. 
1501A-598-99. In other words, Congress intended the Act 
to overrule court decisions holding bona fide sellers of 
recyclable materials liable under CERCLA. See, e.g., 145 
Cong. Rec. S10391-01, S10431 (August 5, 1999) (Statement 
of Senator Lott) (noting that the Act was intended to 
"remove[ ] an unintended consequence of the Superfund 
statute" including court decisions holding "that recyclables 
are materials that have been disposed of and ar e therefore 
subject to Superfund liability"). 
 
Second, it is clear from the Act's legislative history that 
Congress realized not all components of"recyclable 
materials," including spent lead-acid batteries, are 
recyclable. For instance, the legislative history placed on 
the record for S. 1528 explains that: 
 
       for a transaction to be deemed arranging for r ecycling, 
       a substantial portion, but not all, of the r ecyclable 
       material [e.g., a spent lead-acid battery] must have 
       been sold with the intention that the material would be 
       used as a raw material, in place of a virgin material, in 
       the manufacture of a new product. 
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145 Cong. Rec. S14986-03, S15049 (November 19, 1999) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Other unequivocal evidence that Congress did not intend 
to require that a "recyclable material" be 100% recyclable 
can be found throughout the Act's six-year legislative 
history. According to that history: 
 
        The first part of [the fourth element] acknowledges 
       the fact that modern technology has developed to the 
       point where some consuming facilities exclusively 
       utilize recyclable materials as their raw material 
       feedstock and manufacture a product that, had it been 
       made at another facility, may have been manufactur ed 
       using virgin materials. Thus, the fact that the 
       recyclable material did not directly displace a virgin 
       material as the raw material feedstock should not be 
       evidence that the requirements of [S 9627(c)] were not 
       met. 
 
        Secondary feedstocks may compete both dir ectly and 
       indirectly with virgin or primary feedstocks. In some 
       cases a secondary feedstock can directly substitute for 
       a virgin material in the same manufacturing pr ocess. 
       In other cases, however, a secondary feedstock used at 
       a particular manufacturing plant may not be a dir ect 
       substitute for a virgin feedstock, but the pr oduct of 
       that plant competes with a product made elsewhere 
       from virgin material. For example aluminum may be 
       utilized at a given facility using either vir gin or 
       secondary feedstocks meeting certain specifications. In 
       this case, the virgin and secondary feedstock materials 
       compete directly. A particular steel mill, however, may 
       only utilize scrap iron and steel as a feedstock because 
       of the design restrictions of the facility. If that mill 
       makes a steel product that competes with the steel 
       product of another mill, which utilizes a vir gin 
       feedstock, the conditions of this paragraph have been 
       met. In this example, the two streams of feedstock 
       materials do not directly compete, but the pr oduct 
       made from them do. It is the intent of this paragraph 
       that the person be able to demonstrate the general use 
       for which the feedstock material was utilized. It is not 
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       the intent that the person show that a specific unit was 
       incorporated into a new product 
 
Id. Thus, the language of the fourth element is intended to 
explain when a recycling transaction is deemed to displace 
the use of virgin raw materials, not to r estrict the Act's 
coverage to materials that are 100% recyclable. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In summary, we hold that Congress intended the 
Superfund Recycling Equity Act to apply r etroactively to 
judicial actions initiated by private parties prior to 
November 29, 1999, if still pending on that date. Gould's 
contribution claims against Appellants meet those criteria. 
Thus, the Act applies to Gould's claims, and the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment to Gould on the 
issue of contribution liability, as well as its judgment 
allocating liability, will be vacated. We will remand the 
cause to the District Court for it to determine whether 
Appellants satisfy the Act's requirements for exemption 
from liability. 
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